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Abstract
Happiness is reported in ordered intervals (e.g. very, pretty, not too happy). We review
and apply standard statistical results to determine when such data permit identification of
two groups’ relative average happiness. The necessary conditions for nonparametric identifi-
cation are strong and unlikely to be ever satisfied. Standard parametric approaches cannot
identify this ranking unless the variances are exactly equal. If not, ordered probit findings
can be reversed by lognormal transformations. For nine prominent happiness research areas,
conditions for nonparametric identification are rejected and standard parametric results are




A large literature has attempted to establish the determinants of happiness using ordered
response data from questions such as “Taking all things together, how would you say things
are these days – would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?”1 We
review and synthesize how some well-known results from statistics and microeconomic theory
apply to such data, and reach the striking conclusion that the results from the literature are
essentially uninformative about how various factors affect average happiness.
The basic argument is as follows. There are a large (possibly infinite) number of states of
happiness which are strictly ranked. In order to calculate a group’s ‘mean’ happiness, these
states must be cardinalized, but there are an infinite number of arbitrary cardinalizations,
each producing a different set of means. The ranking of the means remains the same for
all cardinalizations only if the distribution of happiness states for one group first order
stochastically dominates that for the other. But, we do not observe the actual distribution
of states. We instead observe their distribution in a small number of discrete categories,
essentially a few intervals of their cumulative distribution functions.
Without additional assumptions we cannot rank the average happiness of two groups if
each has responses in the highest and lowest category. Using observed covariates to achieve
full nonparametric identification of the latent happiness distributions would require making
assumptions that happiness researchers generally claim to reject. We are therefore forced
to follow the standard approach and assume the latent distributions are from a common
unbounded location-scale family (e.g., an ordered probit). If we do, it is (almost) impossible
to get stochastic dominance, and the conclusion is therefore not robust to simple monotonic
transformations of the scale. In the case of the normal, there are always distributions in
the lognormal family that reverse the result. Even in the knife-edge case where it would
be possible to get stochastic dominance, the result would still be subject to the assumption
1Our analysis applies, mutatis mutandis, to other common questions such as those with five, seven or ten
response categories
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that all individuals report happiness the same way (a common reporting function), something
which we show empirically is unlikely to be the case.
We outline conditions under which we can identify the rank ordering of group happiness,
and then apply them to nine prominent results from the happiness literature. Not a single
one is satisfied in any case. We also describe a test for common reporting of happiness under
the assumption that happiness follows a distribution from the normal family. Whenever the
data allow us to perform such a test, we reject it.
2 Rank-Order Identification of Group Happiness
Suppose a researcher has two groups A and B, and she wishes to claim that members of
group A are, on average, happier than members of group B. What assumptions are required
to make such a claim?
Unfortunately, with happiness data we will never be able to simply compare the aver-
age group responses directly. That would require happiness to have been reported to the
researcher on an interval scale, the impossibility of which should be uncontroversial.2 Thus
we assume we are presented with an ordinal ranking of individuals’ happiness, and denote
individual i’s happiness in this order as Hi and the cdf of happiness for group k as Fk.
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Provided this ranking is complete, transitive, and continuous, from Debreu (1954) there
exists a cardinalization q such that, Hi > Hj ⇔ q (Hi) > q (Hj). Thus, in principle, we
can compare group means under this cardinalization. This approach is implicit in nearly
the entire empirical happiness literature. However, we know from Pareto (1909, pp. 541-2),
that q is not unique. There are infinite other cardinalizations, and changes in cardinaliza-
tion can change the ranking of means unless, as is well-known, there is first order stochastic
2It would require some way of eliciting each individual’s happiness on a scale where the difference between
a “99” and a “98” is the same difference in happiness as between a “97” and a “96”, or a “7” and a “6”, and
so on. See Stevens (1946).
3To draw anything at all from the happiness literature, it is absolutely essential that it is possible to make
interpersonal utility comparisons, an assumption we maintain throughout. But this is, itself, a controversial
topic. For a brief review, see Binmore (2009).
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dominance (FOSD).4 Therefore, to conclude that group A is happier than group B, we must
observe that FA first order stochastically dominates FB.
In practice, happiness researchers never observe Fk directly. Instead they observe subjec-
tive responses in a small number of categories, such as “not too happy,” “pretty happy,” or
“very happy.” Suppose we have three categories S = {0, 1, 2}, and let rkS be the fraction of
respondents in group k who report happiness S. It is plausible that individuals follow a co-
herent introspective reporting rule, so that they report 0 if Hi ≤ H1i and 1 if H1i ≤ Hi ≤ H2i .5




i vary across individuals; a large number
of “very happy” responses in group A may indicate a high FA or low H
2
i s. For the moment
we assume H1i = H
1, H2i = H
2∀i, that is a common reporting function, so the subjective
responses inform us of two points on each cdf: Fk(H
1) = rk0 and Fk(H
2) = 1− rk2 .
Unfortunately, FA(H
1) ≤ FB(H1) and FA(H2) ≤ FB(H2) (i.e., “stochastic dominance”
in the categories) does not directly imply FA FOSD FB. It simply narrows the set of possible
group distributions of happiness (see, for example, Manski 1988) to the set of all combinations
of cdfs for which FA(H
1) = rA0 , FB(H
1) = rB0 , FA(H
2) = 1 − rA2 , FB(H2) = 1 − rB2 . In other
words, any two distributions that produce the observed happiness distribution in categories,
by group, describe the data equally well.
Following this, we say the rank order of A and B is identified only if for every pair
of distributions consistent with the data we have FA FOSD FB or FB FOSD FA.
6 That
is, if A and B are rank order identified, the rankings of q̄A and q̄B will be the same for
any cardinalization of any distribution that can describe the data. Requiring rank-order
identification should again be uncontroversial. Rejecting this, requires making definitive
statements about rankings that hold for some arbitrary cardinalizations or equivalently some
arbitrary distributions, but not others satisfying the same a priori restrictions and describing
4See Lehmann (1955). This result entered the economics literature in the late 1960s (e.g, Hader and
Russell 1969; Hanoch and Levy 1969).
5We will use a 3-point happiness scale going forward for illustrative purposes, but the discussion easily
extends to 4 or more categories.
6For a formal definition of rank order identification, see the Online Technical Appendix.
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the data equally well.
We now explore the conditions under which group happiness is rank-order identified. We
begin with methods that do not rely on distributional assumptions, then consider restricting
the set of permissible distributions (i.e. parametric assumptions such as ordered probit).
2.1 Non-Parametric Identification
To simplify exposition, we normalize the cutoffs between the categories to H1 = 0 and
H2 = 1. Put differently, we restrict ourselves to the set of cardinalizations with this property.
When is the ranking of A over B identified without assuming a distribution for FA and
FB? If we use just the ordered responses, from Manski and Tamer (2002) we must have
rA0 = 0, r
B
2 = 0, and r
A
2 ≥ rB1 .7 If both groups have responses in the lowest category, the
data can be represented by distributions where nearly all the unhappy As are close to −∞
and all the unhappy Bs close to −ε, and vice versa. Similar logic applies when both groups
have responses in the highest category. Even if the lowest category for A and the highest
category for B are empty, all As might be clustered at the bottom of their categories (i.e., ε
and 1 + ε) while Bs might be clustered at their tops (i.e., −ε and 1 − ε); rA2 > rB1 ensures
that the distribution of A still dominates B in these situations. In practice, such a strong
set of conditions will never be satisfied (see Table 1 below) for a sample of any reasonable
size. Thus if happiness is reported using a discrete ordered scale, in practice we cannot
rank the mean happiness of two groups without additional information or restrictions on the
happiness distribution.
Now, suppose we have a vector of observable determinants of happiness X, and assume
we can partition i’s latent happiness
h∗i = ψ(Xi) + ui (1)
7If there are S + 1 categories, we require that rA0 = 0, r
B








j ∀s = 1, ...S. We follow
the literature on focusing on comparing means. Conditions for comparing, for example, medians are weaker
and sometimes satisfied in practice.
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into an observable component Xi with distribution F
X
k in group k, and an additively sep-
arable unobservable component ui with distribution F
u
k . The function ψ transforms the
observable components from their reported scale (e.g. dollars of income) to happiness under
the chosen cardinalization. Note that in addition to a common reporting function, we assume
ψ does not vary across groups. This assumption is implausible and also not strictly neces-
sary for identification, but we simplify the environment to achieve rank-order identification
as easily as possible.8
As Manski (1988) shows for a binary response, and Cameron and Heckman (1998) extend
to a general ordered response model, we can identify ψ, F u, and F h through assumptions
on the relations among X, u, and h, thereby avoiding assumptions about the distribution
of h or u.9 In our context, the key condition for nonparametric identification (Carneiro,
Hansen, and Heckman 2003, Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro 2007) is that the support of u
is contained in the support of ψ(X). As Manski discusses, this condition is critical;10 yet
it is problematic for happiness studies. The major observable determinants such as income
and marital status are bounded in practice, while factors such as physical and psychological
health are, at best, observed only in discrete ordered categories and at worst unobservable
and unbounded.11
To illustrate this problem, consider some authors’ claim that there is a “satiation point”
beyond which income does not increase happiness.12 If they are correct, then as X →
∞, ψ(X)→ ψ̄ where X is income. Above −ψ̄ we can identify the distribution of u based on
differences between reported happiness and that which would be predicted by ψ(X). But
8In order to place both groups on the same cardinalization, it is necessary that either both groups follow
the same reporting rule, or both groups have some common X that has the same effect on the true latent
variable. See Urzua (2008).
9See the Online Technical Appendix for the full list of conditions.
10See Manski’s (1988) discussion surrounding Proposition 2, Corollary 1.
11While the condition is not formally testable, since we do not observe all possible draws of X from FX ,
we note that the individual with the lowest family income (as calculated by Stevenson and Wolfers 2009) in
the General Social Survey reports being “pretty happy.”
12Note that our appendix implicitly refutes such claims. Stevenson and Wolfers (2013) reviews a number
of papers which argue for a satiation point with respect to income, and find no support for this claim in any
dataset using methods conventional within the happiness literature. Nonetheless, this has not stopped such
claims from being made. See, for example, Jebb et al. (2018).
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we cannot learn anything about the distribution of u below −ψ̄ since all values in this range
result in a report of “not very happy” for any X. Within the set of admissible distributions,
u could be concentrated just below −ψ̄ for one group and concentrated near −∞ for another.
Even if A stochastically dominates B above −ψ̄, the distributions could cross below −ψ̄, thus
we cannot have rank-order identification. A similar problem arises when X is bounded.
In sum, while theoretically possible, in practice we are unlikely to have the observables
necessary to non-parametrically identify the tails of the happiness distribution, without
which the means of two groups are never rank-order identified.
2.2 Parametric Identification
Absent nonparametric identification, we must either conclude that identification is impossible
or rely on parametric identification. Happiness researchers almost universally assume either
that the ordered responses are measured on a discrete interval scale, or that each group’s
latent happiness distribution is normal (i.e., ordered probit) or logistic (i.e., ordered logit).
These different approaches often yield similar results, leading some researchers to conclude
falsely that such assumptions are innocuous (e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004).13
Estimating ordered probit is equivalent to assuming the existence of a single cardinaliza-
tion under which both groups’ happiness is distributed normally, which is in and of itself very
strong.14 Further, the standard ordered probit happiness researchers use also assumes that
under this hypothesized cardinalization the variance of happiness is equal for all groups.15
The assumption is implausible and unnecessary for estimation, but necessary to obtain rank-
13This conclusion may be problematic even sidestepping the issues raised by this paper. Heckman and
Singer (1984) show that despite three common distributional assumptions showing negative unemployment
duration dependence (and two strongly so), using an estimator that does not impose a parametric assumption
produces the expected positive sign.
14Note that imposing that a single group’s happiness is distributed normally is simply selecting an arbitrary
cardinalization.
15The normalization in many statistical packages (such as STATA) imposes that the variance of the
normally distributed unobservables is 1 and that the constant term is 0. If the ordered probit were applied
separately without additional covariates, the program would report different cutpoints, implying a different
reporting function but the same mean and variance for all groups. In the online appendix, we normalize the
first two cutpoints to 0 and 1 and estimate separate means and variances for each group.
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order identification through ordered probit. It is well known that for unbounded distributions
from the location-scale family, one distribution is greater than the other in the sense of FOSD
if and only if their location parameters differ and their scale parameters are equal.16
Moreover, in practice, as the sample size gets large, we will never estimate identical scale
parameters even if the true scale parameters are equal.17 Of course, we may be unable to
reject equality, but we hardly need remind the reader that failure to reject and accepting the
null are not equivalent. Thus, for large sample sizes, these techniques will never be able to
identify which group is happier without further restrictions. Interestingly, this is true even
if the condition in section 2.1 is satisfied.
What types of cardinalizations reverse the conclusion drawn from the normal? Suppose
we estimate µA > µB, but σA < σB. The rank-ordering is preserved by all concave but not
all convex transformations (Hanoch and Levy 1969).18 One simple convex transformation
is ech
∗




which is increasing in σ. For c sufficiently large this transformation reverses the ranking.
When µA > µB and σA > σB, the ranking is preserved by convex transformations, but not
concave ones, such as −e−ch∗ . This generates a left-skewed lognormal distribution, with
mean
µτ = −e−cµ+.5c2σ2 (3)
which is decreasing in σ. Thus a sufficiently large c reverses the gap. These are both simple
monotonic transformations of the latent happiness variable. Since happiness is ordinal, these
16The proof of this is a simple algebra exercise dating at least to Bawa (1975). A close corollary serves as
an exercise in a popular graduate textbook (Casella and Berger 2002, p. 407). An alternative proof for the
multivariate normal is in Müller (2001).
17Assuming estimation by maximum likelihood, the estimates will be asymptotically normal and their
difference will also have a normal limiting distribution. See the working paper for more discussion.
18Hanoch and Levy show this result for any distribution which can be characterized by two parameters
that are independent functions of the mean and variance of the distribution, a subset of the location-scale
family.
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transformations represent the responses equally well. It is possible to achieve stochastic
dominance using bounded distributions from the location-scale family, such as the uniform.
But, there is little or no reason to prefer a bounded distribution over unbounded ones, from
the location-scale family or otherwise, that do not exhibit FOSD.
In sum, it is impossible to rank order groups using only the parametric assumptions
made in the literature or any of the location/scale distributions typically used by empirical
researchers. Identification might be achieved by applying additional restrictions to a standard
distribution (i.e. placing restrictions on the set of permissable cardinalizations). Addressing
whether a researcher could make a compelling case for such restrictions or the profession could
reach a consensus on them would take us into the philosophy and sociology of science and
beyond the scope of this paper. In the empirical section below we show that standard results
can almost always be reversed using what we are confident are plausible transformations
within the lognormal.
2.3 Reporting Function
It follows from our discussion that if true happiness is normally distributed with different
variances between groups, there is always a reporting function such that the difference in
mean reported happiness has the opposite sign from the true difference. But even this result
assumes that all individuals report their happiness the same way. Up to now, it has been
convenient to assume a common reporting function, but as we show in the empirical section,
this assumption is unlikely to be correct.19
King et al. (2004) propose circumventing differences in reporting functions by using
‘vignettes’ to anchor the scale on which people report happiness. This requires that (1)
individuals evaluate the vignettes on the same scale as they evaluate their own well-being
(“response consistency”), and (2) each individual perceives the same value from the vignettes
19See also Ravallion, Himelein, and Beegle (2016), who find evidence of substantial differences in the
reporting function (“scale heterogeneity” in their terminology) for subjective poverty status both within and
across countries.
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(“vignette equivalence”). Both assumptions are strong, the second particularly so, given het-
erogenous preferences. Moreover, as discussed above, even if we could place all individuals’
happiness on a common scale, monotonic transformations of this scale would reverse group
rankings.
Still, it is often easy to test for a common reporting function under a given parametric
assumption. Suppose, for example, happiness is reported in N ≥ 4 categories, and we impose
normality, setting the first two cutoffs to be 0 and 1. This ‘identifies’ the means and variances
of the distributions and leaves N − 3 cutoffs free. It is straightforward to test whether the
free cutoffs are the same for all groups. Of course, faced with a rejection, the researcher
is free to conclude either that her initial conjecture about the cardinalization was wrong or
that the reporting functions differ, but we believe that, at the very least, testing the joint
hypothesis should be standard procedure.20
3 Empirical Tests of the Happiness Literature
In the previous section we outlined the conditions under which the rank order of happiness for
groups can be identified using categorical data on subjective well-being. We now put these
into practice for nine key results from the happiness literature: the Easterlin (1973, 1974)
Paradox for the United States, whether happiness is U-shaped in age, the optimal policy
trade-off between inflation and unemployment, rankings of countries by happiness, whether
the Moving to Opportunity program increased happiness, whether marriage increases hap-
piness, whether children decrease happiness, the relative decline of female happiness in the
United States, and whether disabilities decrease happiness.21 For each of these, we first
ask if we can draw any conclusions without assuming a parametric distribution by applying
the criterion in section 2.1. We then test whether we can reject equal variances under an
20Note that we can also reject for any cardinalization in which the latent variable and cutpoints can be
represented by the same monotonic transformation of the normal.
21For details of the estimation procedures and literature review of these results, see the Online Empirical
Appendix.
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assumed normal distribution, and determine whether the conclusions can be reversed using
a left-skewed or right-skewed lognormal transformation, as outlined in section 2.2, and the
degree of skewness required. Finally, when we have sufficient happiness categories, we also
test for equal reporting functions assuming the existence of a cardinalization from the normal
family as discussed in section 2.3.
Table 1 summarizes the results. None of these results are identified non-parametrically.
Moreover, in the eight cases for which we can test for equality of variances under a parametric
normal assumption, we reject equality. Thus we never have rank order identification, and
can always reverse the standard conclusion by instead assuming a left-skewed or right-skewed
lognormal. Further, in the seven cases where we are able to test for stability of the reporting
function, we reject every time.
Thus if researchers wanted to draw any conclusions from these data, they would have
to eschew rank order identification. In other words, they would have to argue that it is
appropriate to inform policy based on one arbitrary cardinalization of happiness but not
another, or equivalently that some cardinalizations are “less arbitrary” than others. It is
unclear from where such an argument would come, or why we should apply a different
standard for happiness research than other branches of economics.
Even if someone were to make this case, we cannot see how such a standard would say
that distributions that resemble objective economic variables would be implausible. In the
Online Empirical Appendix we further show that nearly every result can be reversed by a
lognormal transformation that is no more skewed than the wealth distribution of the United
States.22 Even within this class of distributional assumptions, we cannot draw conclusions
stronger than “Nigeria is somewhere between the happiest and least happy country in the
world,” or “the effect of the unemployment rate on average happiness is somewhere between
very positive and very negative.” To be clear, we are not proposing that satisfying this
minimal criterion would make a result convincingly robust. It is plausible that happiness
22The exceptions are that the disabled are less happy than the non-disabled and that married women are
happier than unmarried women. In both cases, we reject a common reporting function.
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is more skewed than wealth is. And it is certainly not self-evident that happiness must be
normal or lognormal. Happiness could be left-skewed for men and right-skewed for women,
and their distributions might come from different families. And any claims of robustness
would have to address our consistent finding of different reporting functions across groups.
While we cannot rule out the possibility that happiness researchers will be able to find
cardinalizations that are both consistent with a common reporting function and are robust
within some parametric restrictions that most economists will find compelling, we are not
sanguine about this prospect.
4 Conclusion
It is essentially impossible to rank two groups based on their mean happiness using the types
of survey questions prevalent in the literature. Because happiness is ordinal, two groups can
be ranked only if the distribution of one group first order stochastically dominates the dis-
tribution of the other. We can infer FOSD from the ordered response data alone only in
extreme cases that do not occur in practice. The conditions for full identification through
variation in observables are also violated. The parametric assumptions in the literature are
incapable of producing FOSD without untenably strong assumptions about the happiness
distribution. All of these conclusions are direct implications of well-established and uncon-
troversial results.
What then can we learn from such data? The regression estimates from ordered probit or
logit are only accurate for one particular, arbitrary (and possibly nonexistent) cardinalization
of happiness. This does not discount the actual self-reports, themselves. If we are only
concerned about the number of people who subjectively consider their emotional state “not
too happy,” we can estimate effects using conventional binary response models. But, it is
important to recognize that such an interpretation is much narrower than proponents of
the use of average happiness measures currently claim for them. Subjective perceptions are
13
subjective and introspective, and generalizations drawn from such analysis are particularly
sensitive to differences in the reporting function.
Researchers who wish to continue to interpret such questions more broadly need to be
explicit about the assumptions underlying their conclusions, and justify their particular
cardinalization or parametric assumption relative to other plausible alternatives. It is not
clear what this justification could be, and our empirical work finds little evidence that even
very strong restrictions will yield interpretable results. At a bare minimum, we would require
a functional form assumption that survived the joint test of the parametric functional form
and common reporting function across groups. Certainly calls to replace GDP with measures
of national happiness are premature.
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Table 1: Rank Order-Identification in the Happiness Literature: A Summary of Results
Non- Equal Transformation Equal
Parametric Variances to Reverse Reporting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Easterlin Paradox (U.S.): No Reject Left-Skewed e
Happines does not increase
with per capital income
Happiness is U-shaped with No Reject b Reject
respect to age
Inflation/Unemployment No Reject c Reject
Tradeoff
Moving to Opportunity No a Right-skewed Reject
increasd subjective well-
being
Country Rankings of No Reject c Reject
Happiness
Marriage increases No Reject d Reject
happiness
Children at home No Reject Left-skewed Reject
reduce happiness
Relative female happiness No Reject Left-skewed e
has declined (U.S.)
Disability reduces happiness No Reject Right-skewed Reject
Notes - For details of the procedures for each case, see the online appendix. Column (1) checks the condition for non-parametric
identification discussed in section 2.1. Column (2) reports result of test of equal reporting functions conditional on the
existance of a common cardinalization in the normal family. Column (3) reports result of test of equal variances under a
normal cardinalization. Column (4) reports whether the results from the normal cardinalization are reversed by a left-skewed
or right-skewed log normal.
a Not testable because calculated from published results.
b Depends on country.
c Left-skewed makes unemployment more important.
d Right-skewed for men, left-skewed for women.
e Not testable as only three happiness categories used.
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